Agent-to-agent communication security
Runlayer materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for trust or policy enforcement between agents.
Public-source research
Review what vendors say publicly, the exact quoted source text, the security requirement each statement may support, and what still needs verification.
Showing 261–280 of 1280 evidence records
Runlayer materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for trust or policy enforcement between agents.
Runlayer materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for non-human identity, service-account, secret, or workload credential lifecycle controls.
Runlayer claims identity-aware access policy and scoped permissions for users and agents.
under which identity, budget, OAuth grant, and runtime conditions
Runlayer claims centralized controls for employees using Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT, Codex, internal agents, Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, and existing AI clients.
employees are adopting Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT, Codex, and internal agents
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for enterprise-wide discovery of unapproved AI use.
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for embedded AI discovery across the business-application environment.
Keycard claims visibility and attribution for agent actions, tool calls, policy decisions, and data access.
See every action your agents take. Know exactly who authorized it.
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for policy enforcement over unapproved AI use.
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for inspection or enforcement over sensitive data moving through AI.
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for browser or software as a service (SaaS)-session controls for employee AI use.
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for security controls for custom generative AI applications at runtime.
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for enterprise AI governance, risk, approval, and compliance workflows.
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for adversarial testing or release assurance for AI systems.
Keycard materials reviewed did not provide a public claim for model and AI component supply-chain inspection.
Keycard claims authentication and task-scoped access controls for Model Context Protocol (MCP), CLI, application programming interface (API), and downstream services.
Add auth to any agent surface - MCP, CLI, or API.
Keycard claims a real-time event stream of agent actions, tool calls, policy decisions, and attributed audit events.
A real-time event stream of every agent action, tool call, and policy decision.
Keycard claims authentication for agent-to-agent delegation while preserving user identity.
Announcing Keycard for Multi-Agent Apps
Keycard claims workload attestation and short-lived credentials that avoid long-lived secrets and over-permissioned service accounts.
No long-lived secrets, no over-permissioned service accounts.
Keycard claims composite user, device, agent, and task identity with runtime policy and task-scoped credentials.
Identity = user + device + agent + task
Keycard claims governance of coding-agent shell, script, Model Context Protocol (MCP), environment, credential, and audit paths.
keycard run virtualizes .env and mcp.json so credentials never hit disk, and every execution path is audited.